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ABSTRACT 
 
Resource rents represent a return to the community for the exclusive use of resources 
and therefore are quite distinct from the recovery of governmental regulatory or 
operating costs. While the current framework for resource rents in Australian primary 
industries is providing financial benefit for Australian governments, it is uncertain 
whether the current policy settings are providing an appropriate community return. 
This paper discusses the theory underpinning resource rents and conducts a multi-
jurisdictional comparison focusing on the minerals and fisheries industries to aid 
analysis of the role resource rent taxation plays in the existing management of 
Australian primary industries. 




Resource rent refers to the excess profit, or ‘super-normal’ profit, over the level 
earned in a competitive market. Resource rent is equal to the difference between 
revenue and costs (including a competitive return on capital).  
 
It is often argued that natural resources, such as mineral deposits, wild fisheries and 
native forests, belong to the community and, as a public asset, any use of those 
resources for private gain should yield a return to society. Various taxation 
mechanisms have been developed and adopted to ensure that those who have been 
given access to natural resources provide such a return to society. 
  
The objective of this paper is to consider the nature of some of the resource rent tax 
mechanisms that have been applied to natural resource based industries with a view to 
identifying some remaining policy issues and potential areas for reform. A review of 
the theory of resource rents is provided, followed by a brief overview of the various 
methods by which rents can be collected and a description of some of the present 
resource rent policy settings among the Commonwealth, states and territories for a 
range of primary industries. The paper concludes with some observations on the 
consistency and effectiveness of these arrangements with the objective of promoting 





While the issue of resource rents has its origins in Ricardo’s principles of 1819, the 
first suggestion of applying taxes to mining projects based on mineral rents in 
Australia was by Henderson (1971), who proposed that all new mining leases be 
auctioned to collect rents associated with potential mining projects. Henderson’s 
proposal was followed by the widely acknowledged 1975 paper by Garnaut and 
Clunies-Ross (1975) entitled “Uncertainty, risk aversion and the taxing of natural 
resource projects”, in which it was proposed that a resource rent tax (RRT) based on 
realised rents be applied to natural resource projects in developing countries in order 
to permit the economic benefit of such projects to remain within the domestic   4 
economy. In 1976, Swan proposed the Brown Tax, whereby government receives a 
constant percentage of a miner’s profit on a specified project, as an option for taxing 
realised rent (Lloyd 1984). 
 
In the late seventies a fourfold increase in the price of oil was matched by both coal 
and uranium (substitutes for power generation). The Commonwealth Government 
moved to capture the new found ‘rent’ being produced for crude oil and LPG through 
an excise tax (Dowell 1984). Tax collections from the period of 1975-84 totalled over 
$22 billion. This led to questioning as to whether states were collecting sufficient 
revenue within their jurisdictions. In 1979 Garnaut and Clunies-Ross compiled a 
paper proposing that a resource rent tax be substituted for all existing royalties that 
they deemed ‘inefficient’ (Dowell 1984 p. 438). 
 
The oil shock of the 1970’s also generated further interest in the RRT for application 
to mining and petroleum projects within developed countries (Hogan 2003), with 
numerous proposals for rent based taxes being examined in the 1970’s and 80’s. A 
great deal of this research substantially contributed to the current resource rent royalty 




Economic rent can be defined as the earnings from any activity that exceed the costs 
required to make the activity economically sustainable in the long term (Campbell & 
Haynes 1990 p.5). Economic rent refers to the surplus that is created as a consequence 
of a business activity and may be considered to be the difference between consumers’ 
willingness to pay (WTP) and the price at which firms are willing to supply (costs). 
Clearly, part of this rent is returned to management as reward for entrepreneurial input 
and may be labelled as “normal profit”. Any remaining rent can be viewed as ‘super 
profit’. Such super profit would not normally be expected to occur in a competitive 
industry and therefore is most commonly associated with some form of market 
failure, such as where a monopolist extracts rents from consumers by restricting 
supply to below the competitive level of output. 
   5 
However, granting exclusive access to a particular natural resource can also contribute 
to ‘super profit’, or resource rent, earned by the harvester or miner (NSW DPI 2005). 
The concept of normal profit and super profit is illustrated in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: Resource rent and normal profits 
 
 
Source: (NSW DPI 2005)  
 
Resource rent is essentially a long term concept. Figure 2(i) illustrates a perfectly 
competitive industry that is assumed to have a perfectly elastic (horizontal) long run 
marginal cost (supply) curve due to the ability of existing and potential new entrants 
to replicate the most efficient producer’s production facilities (and hence marginal 
cost), resulting in an output of qc at price pc. However, in circumstances where 
competitors are unable to match the marginal cost of the most efficient competitor and 
where the most efficient competitor cannot duplicate their marginal cost structure 
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The concept of resource rent is most easily explained by taking an extreme view of 
Ricardo’s land rent example, which assumes that the supply of agricultural land is 
fixed and, hence, the long run supply curve of agricultural products that rely on the 
use of land is vertical. Figure 2(ii) illustrates that in such as case, a quantity ql will be 
produced (at a ‘normal’ cost of production of b) and sold at price pl. The level of 
output ql is lower than that that would be produced in a competitive market, and the 
price pl is higher than the competitive price pc. This results in a land rent equivalent to 
pl-a-b-pc accruing to the owners of land.  
 
However, for non-renewable resources, such as minerals, a less profuse generation of 
rent could be expected to occur due to the fact that mineral extraction can be 
expanded through increasing the output of existing mines and/or the opening of new 
mines. There are, nevertheless, impediments to the establishment of a perfectly 
competitive minerals market due to the heterogeneity of mineral deposits, such that 
high quality deposits will be able to produce a unit of output at lower cost than poor 
quality deposits. It is this heterogeneity that gives rise to a long run industry marginal 
cost curve that is upward sloping and convex – that is, the aggregation of individual 
firms’ marginal cost curves ranked in ascending order. It should be kept in mind that 
the cost of resource extraction is assumed to include the cost of production from 
existing mines, the cost of developing new mines to extract known deposits and the 
cost of exploration to make deposits known.  
 
The nature of resource rent is illustrated in Figure 3. Where producers are willing and 
able to produce quantity qw at price pw, ‘differential’ rent equivalent to pw-a-b will   7 
arise due to the differences in deposit quality, as discussed above. This is precisely 
what is known as producer surplus in other contexts, and is most easily conceptualised 
by considering the qw-pw outcome for the most and least efficient producers - the most 
efficient producer will be accruing differential rents of around pw-a per unit, whereas 
the least efficient producer will be receiving little or no rent because they are 




ps           c
scarcity rent




qs qw  
 
There is, however, another potential source of resource rent – ‘scarcity’ rent, which 
has its foundation in Hotelling’s 1931 article ‘The Economics of Exhaustible 
Resources’. The notion of scarcity rent relies on the assumption that the 
economically-recoverable stock of exhaustible resources is fixed. Consequently, those 
that have a property right in resources will require a return on the capital invested in 
those resources that is equal to the return they could obtain by selling their stake and 
investing elsewhere. Assuming a competitive market for both the resource and capital, 
this means that the resource price in the present period must be less than the price in 
the subsequent period and so on, and that this difference will be equal to the rate of 
interest (Anderson 1985). If this were not so, resource owners would have an 
incentive to either increase extraction (if future prices were not sufficiently higher 
than present prices) or reduce extraction (if future prices were greater than present 
prices plus interest).  
   8 
Figure 3 illustrates the fact that the aforementioned incentive for producers to limit 
present production in order to achieve higher prices in future is the basis for scarcity 
rent. In equilibrium, a decrease in production from qw to qs causes an increase in price 
from pw to ps, resulting in scarcity rents of ps-c-d-pw. The realisation of scarcity rents 
is not necessarily a bad thing – the restriction of resource extraction to take advantage 
of higher future prices would lead to the socially optimal level of extraction if the 
prevailing interest rate equals society’s discount rate. Of course, the degree to which 
scarcity rents actually occur depends on the extent to which the assumption, that the 
stock of resources is fixed, holds.  
 
RENEWABLE AND NON-RENEWABLE RESOURCE RENTS 
As with non-renewable resources, renewable resources can generate differential rents 
associated with differences in the costs structures of harvesters (Anderson 1985). 
However, the ability of a renewable resource to regenerate itself in the face of 
harvesting, thereby offering the prospect of generating rents in perpetuity, renders 
renewable resources distinctly different from non-renewables.  
 
While non-renewable resource extractors that have been granted a property right over 
some portion of the resource can contemplate either immediate or delayed extraction 
and will decide on their level of extraction according to the respective returns, 
renewable resource harvesters in an open-access management framework are not in a 
position to delay harvest as they cannot be sure that another harvester will not harvest 
the resource beforehand. Consequently, rents will be competed away in the short term 
and over-harvesting will likely deplete the resource such that the magnitude of 
potential future rents is much reduced. It is this ‘common property’ problem that 
requires society, as the resource owner, to overtly manage access to the resource to 
optimise the rate of extraction.  
 
By limiting the level of harvest to the point where society’s marginal cost curve 
(which incorporates a return on future rents) intersects marginal benefit (the demand 
curve), the quantity harvested will be lower than the competitive outcome where price 
equals average cost (Kalymon 1981). Such a restriction on harvest would generate 
scarcity rents similar to that shown in Figure 3. Kalymon (1981) shows that there will 
generally be two equilibrium harvest levels for a renewable resource: (i) low   9 
population – low sustainable harvest; and (ii) high population – high sustainable 
harvest, and claims that the former is the least stable and associated with resource 
extinction due to the economic incentives associated with temporary over 
exploitation. However, Kalymon suggests that temporary under-harvesting in the low 
population – low sustainable harvest situation would lead to population increase and 
consequent increase in sustainable harvest and associated rents through time.  
 
RESOURCE RENT TAXES 
There are both equity and efficiency grounds for government to aim to appropriate a 
portion of any resource rent that arises from the granting of an exclusive property 
right in certain natural resources on behalf of the community.  
 
While government may be willing to grant exclusive property rights over natural 
resources in order to ensure efficiency in their discovery or extraction, the ability of 
the resource extractor to appropriate resource rents from consumers through the use of 
a resource that belongs to society is typically viewed as inequitable. There is therefore 
a community expectation that those that are allowed to use natural resources for profit 
will be made to return some of the associated revenues to society. 
 
The previous section explained the theoretical efficiency underpinnings of resource 
rent taxes, the existence of which rely heavily on their assumptions. For instance, the 
ability of miners to extract scarcity rents depends on their ability to control the rate of 
extraction over the resource. However, if government imposes expiry dates on 
exploration and development licenses, as they typically do, the consequent inability of 
miners to delay extraction could lead to a ‘common property’ problem, whereby 
miners are obliged to extract immediately and, in doing so, compete scarcity rents 
away (Anderson 1985). Such an outcome would be sub-optimal for both extractors 
and society and require deliberate public policy designed to prevent its occurrence. 
 
Given that it is uncertain whether scarcity rents will be present, most resource rent 
taxes focus on the public appropriation of differential rents. The ideal resource rent 
tax would collect a constant percentage of the differential rent, as illustrated in Figure 
4 (Hogan 2007), where government collects pw-b-e, leaving industry with e-b-a. Such 
a RRT is known as a ‘neutral’ profit based royalty, as it would not affect private   10 
investment and production decisions. However, as it requires precise knowledge of 
each firm’s cost structure and revenue stream, the practical implementation of such an 
accurate RRT is not possible, but does provide a good point of comparison when 
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Given that even the highest resource rent taxes around the world generally do not 
exceed 50 per cent of total rents, it might be asked why government does not attempt 
to transfer a greater proportion to society. Theoretically, any level of rent left with 
extractors should provide an incentive to maximise rents through cost minimisation. 
However, it is believed in practice that high levels of rent transfer away from 
extractors greatly reduces their incentive to minimise costs (and hence maximise 
rents), as most of the benefits of doing so would accrue to government under a neutral 
RRT, given that rent would be calculated as revenue less costs. Consequently, at some 
point higher levels of RRT would recover a higher proportion of a smaller rent pool, 
resulting in decreasing returns to society (Anderson 1985). 
 
RESOURCE RENT TAX IMPLEMENTATION 
Designing and managing resource rent taxes can be a costly operation and should only 
be considered if the value of rent collected is known to exceed the costs involved in 
collecting the rent. When designing resource rent taxes, consideration must be given   11 
to whether the selected mechanism is equitable, transparent, cost-effective, efficient 
and applicable. These characteristics are explained further in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5: Design considerations for resource rent taxation arrangements 
 
PRINCIPLE  MEANING  COMMENTS 
Equitable  Charge should be 
consistent and not imposed 
differently for different 
groups 
This may be a problem for 
a fixed fee approach which 
imposes higher costs on 
smaller industry 
participants 
Transparent  Calculation of charges 
imposed should be clear to 
all parties involved and 
based on rules known in 
advance 
Could be difficult if 
calculations depend on 
confidential commercial 
data 
Effective  Costs of calculating, 
imposing and collecting of 
the charge (including 
reviews, dispute 
resolution) should be low 
relative to revenue raised 
This may conflict with 
charges that demand 
regular monitoring and 
review eg multi-species 
fisheries 
Efficient  Perverse incentives should 
not arise that undermine an 
industry.  
Often a trade-off between 
efficiency and 
effectiveness and may 
conflict with a fixed fee or 
ad valorem charge 
Applicable  The chosen overall 
framework should be 
applicable across all 
relevant industry members 
where possible. 
Nonetheless calculation 
details may vary 
(Source: NSW Treasury Comments Paper 2004)  
 
 
TAXATION OF MINERAL RESOURCES IN AUSTRALIA 
Assigning property rights 
The Commonwealth Government is responsible for all oil and gas resources that are 
positioned offshore and outside the three mile territorial sea limit and also for uranium 
and bauxite resources located in the Northern Territory. All other mineral resources 
fall under the jurisdiction of state and territory government authorities (Hogan & 
Donaldson 2000).  
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The Commonwealth and state governments allocate exploration and production 
property rights through three main mechanisms: 
￿  first come, first served- resource rights are allocated to the first applicant; 
￿  work program bidding- resource rights are assigned according to which 
applicant is deemed to be most likely to develop the resource to its full 
potential and optimise development of the surrounding area; and,  
￿  cash bonus bidding- resource rights are granted to the applicant with the 
highest bid. 
 
Cash bonus bidding is theoretically the most efficient approach, whereby the 
government allocating the rights receives a rent payment and benefits from an 
efficient allocation system (as the most efficient miner can afford to bid the highest). 
Cash bonus bidding has been used in relation to exploration permits that were 
assigned in several Australian highly prospective petroleum areas between 1985 and 
1992, with values of winning cash bids ranging from A$1 million to A$20 million.  
 
However, the inherent uncertainty regarding the quality of a particular deposit means 
that bidders will discount their cash bonus bids accordingly. Royalty payments on 
actual production are therefore used to take account of this practice (Hogan 2003).  
 
Once exploration permits are allocated, the government then sets a framework for 
collecting the resource rents within these property right allocations. There are a 
number of alternative methods for resource rent collection that can be grouped under 
either profit-based royalties or output based royalties. 
 
Profit-based royalties: 
•  Brown tax – government receives payments that represent a constant 
percentage of the project’s net cash flow for a specified project for each 
year of the project’s operation. The government collects a set percentage 
of a project’s net cash flow (defined as difference between total revenue 
and total costs) when the project incurs profit, however the government 
provides the firm with a cash rebate in years when profits are negative 
(Hogan 2007); and   13 
•  resource rent royalty or tax – payment is made to government that is a 
constant percentage of the project’s accumulated net profit for each year of 
the project’s operation. Exploration and development costs are 
accumulated at a threshold rate and offset against future revenues. 
 
The Brown tax is considered to be the most efficient collection mechanism but not 
employed due to ‘concerns with government providing cash’ rebates to private 
business (Hogan & Donaldson 2000 p. 524). 
 
The resource rent tax is similar to the Brown tax, though it too has its drawbacks in 
accurately calculating the appropriate threshold rate for costs incurred in the 
exploration/development stages of a project. The resource rent royalty is ‘relatively 
efficient as the levy is set on accumulated profit and fluctuates with changes in prices, 
costs and output’ (Hogan & Donaldson 2000 p. 524).  Ideally the resource rent tax 
should be set so that the government does not receive in excess of the economic rent 
from the private firm and also so that it minimises distortionary effects on private 
decision making (Hogan 2003).  
 
Output based royalties: 
•  ad valorem royalty – payment is made to the government as a constant 
percentage of the value of production; 
•  excise – similar to an ad valorem royalty but payment is based on an 
increasing percentage of the value of production (the excise increases as 
production levels increase); and 
•  specific or quantum royalty – payment to the government is based on a 
constant amount per physical unit of production. 
(Hogan 2003).  
 
The ad valorem royalty varies with price and output, while the specific royalty varies 
only with output and is accordingly considered ‘a more distorting form of royalty than 
the ad valorem’ alternative (Hogan & Donaldson 2000 p. 524).  The quantum royalty 
is relatively simple to calculate and administer and usually applied for low value 
minerals such as coal and limestone (Mineral Resources NSW 2003). Ad valorem   14 
royalties are usually applied to high value and/or high volume minerals (Mineral 
Resources NSW 2003).  
 
 The dilemma with output based royalties is calculating a tax rate that does not 
negatively affect low quality or marginal projects. When there is a varied range of 
both low and high profit projects, which there generally is, output based royalties are 
inclined to overtax low profit earners and undertax high profit earners (Hogan 2007).  
 
For most state and territory based projects, output based royalties are applied, though 
there is considerable variation between jurisdictions. A few profit based royalty 
projects exist, such as the Argyle Diamond mine and projects located at Broken Hill, 
which are a combination of ad valorem and profit based resource rent (Hogan & 
Donaldson 2000). 
 
JURISDICTIONAL MINERAL RESOURCE COMPARISONS 
Petroleum 
Specific and ad valorem royalties are mainly applied to minerals under 
Commonwealth jurisdiction. However, a key exception is the petroleum resource rent 
tax (PRRT). The PRRT was first introduced in Barrow Island in 1985 and introduced 
by the Commonwealth Government in 1987 to apply to all new offshore projects not 
already covered by existing licences and permits (Hogan 2003). The PRRT is 
governed by the Commonwealth Petroleum Resource Rent Tax Assessment Act 1987 
on all offshore petroleum projects with the exception of the North West Shelf. The 
PRRT is a profit based tax levied on all petroleum projects in Australian Government 
waters including crude oil, natural gas, LPG condensate and ethane (Hogan 2003).  
 
The PRRT is a fiscal regime with the objective of encouraging the exploration and 
production of petroleum and simultaneously providing a satisfactory return to the 
community. PRRT is levied at a rate of 40% of a project’s taxable profit. In 2000-01 
financial year collections were significant at $2.4 billion (ATO 2005). 
 
The predominant state or territory petroleum projects are located in the offshore North 
West Australia and Bass Strait areas and in Queensland and South Australia. A profit   15 
based royalty agreement set between the Commonwealth and the Western Australian 
Governments is specific to Barrow Island.  
 
The crude oil excess is calculated on annual production, date of discovery and the 
date of start of production, with the first 30 million barrels exempt. It applies to all 
Commonwealth onshore projects and offshore projects within Australian waters as 
well as the North West Shelf (NWS) permit area (Hogan 2007).  
 
A summary table of all resource rent royalties applied to Australian petroleum 
projects, including the PRRT and state arrangements, is provided in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Resource rent arrangements for Australian petroleum resources 
   
Jurisdiction  Arrangement  Rate 
NSW   AD VALOREM  0-10.0% 
WA  AD VALOREM  10-12.5% 
QLD  AD VALOREM  10% 
VIC  AD VALOREM  10% 
NT  AD VALOREM  10% 
SA  AD VALOREM  10% 
PRRT  PROFIT  40% 
NWS  AD VALOREM  10-12.5% 
BARROW ISLAND  PROFIT  40% 
JPDA  Consultation with East Timor  ● 
CRUDE OIL 
EXCISE 
AD VALOREM  0-35% 
(Source: Hogan 2007)  
JPDA- Joint Petroleum Development Area 
NWS- North West Shelf 
NB: The jurisdictions in italics represent Commonwealth jurisdictions (with 




Coal is the dominant mineral in New South Wales and Queensland, where it is 
extracted for domestic energy production and for export. A 7% ad valorem tax applies 
to coal mines in Queensland and open cut mines in NSW, with a lower rate applying 
to underground mines (to incorporate risk in extracting the resource) (Hogan 2007).   
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The less prevalent and lower quality brown coal is produced in Victoria for electricity 
generation. The specific rate applying to the Victorian resource is based on energy 
content and is adjusted annually for inflation (Hogan 2007).  
 
In Western Australia arrangements vary according to whether the mineral is exported.  
If the coal is not exported then a specific rate is applied. If the coal is exported an ad 
valorem rate is applied. A summary table for the resource rent royalties applying to 
Australian coal resources is provided in Table 2.  
 
Table 2: Resource rent arrangements for Australian coal resources 
Jurisdiction  Arrangement  Rate 
NSW   AD VALOREM  5-7% 
WA  AD VALOREM  7.50% 
  SPECIFIC  $1.00/t 
QLD  AD VALOREM  7% 
VIC  SPECIFIC  $0.588/Gj* 
SA  AD VALOREM  2.50% 
TAS  AD VALOREM/SPECIFIC  1.6-5.0% 
(Source: Hogan 2007)  
* Victoria’s taxation for coal is levied per gigajoule.  
NB: Coal production is zero in the Northern Territory  
 
Metallic Minerals 
Western Australia is particularly abundant in metallic minerals including gold, nickel, 
iron ore and bauxite. Western Australia is closely followed by Queensland with 
substantial deposits of gold, bauxite and mineral sands, as well as being the largest 
producer of base metals including copper, lead and zinc. Large quantities of uranium 
exist in the Northern Territory along with some metallic commodities. South Australia 
and Tasmania also have deposits of metallic minerals. Gold is common to all 
jurisdictions (Hogan 2007).  
 
Ad valorem royalty arrangements are applied to metallic mineral extraction in most 
jurisdictions. In Western Australia, the rate is set “according to extent of processing, 
ranging from 7.5 % for bulk material, 5% for concentrates material and 2.5% for 
metal” (Hogan 2007 p.17).  
 
In Queensland the rate is 2.7%, though a variable option (1.5%-4.5%) is available that 
is set for 5 years after production commencement. Exemptions include the first   17 
$30,000 produced and tax reductions between 20-35% are available if processing is 
carried out in Queensland. Bauxite and mineral sands are not included in this rate, and 
instead are exposed to a 5% ad valorem rate or 10% if bauxite is processed outside 
Queensland (Hogan 2007). 
 
New South Wales, South Australia and Victoria have ad valorem rates of 4%, 2.5% 
and 2.75% respectively. Project specific arrangements do apply in New South Wales 
and South Australia concerning operations in Broken Hill and Olympic Dam. Victoria 
has no royalty on gold production (Hogan 2007). 
 
In Tasmania, rates of between 1.6%-5.0% are applied, depending on profit (the rate is 
applied on an increasing profit scale), and a 20% rate reduction is available if 
processed within Tasmania (Hogan 2007).  
 
A summary table for the resource rent royalties in Australian metallic resources is 
provided in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Resource rent arrangements for Australian metallic resources 
Jurisdiction  Arrangement  Rate 
NSW   AD VALOREM  4% 
WA  AD VALOREM  1.25-7.5% 
QLD  AD VALOREM  1.5-10% 
VIC  AD VALOREM  0-2.75% 
NT  PROFIT  18% 
  AD VALOREM*  5.50% 
SA  AD VALOREM  2.5-3.5% 
TAS  AD VALOREM/SPECIFIC  1.6-5.0% 
(Source: Hogan 2007).  
* Commonwealth jurisdiction 
 
Non-metallic minerals 
Western Australia is the main deposit location for non-metallic minerals, in particular 
diamonds and salt while the Eastern states of New South Wales, Queensland, Victoria 
and also South Australia are dominant in construction minerals. Other important non-
metallic minerals include phosphate rock which is predominant in Queensland, opals 
predominant in New South Wales and South Australia and limestone in most 
states/territories (Hogan 2007).  
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The ad valorem arrangements in South Australia, Victoria and the Northern Territory 
for non-metallic minerals are equivalent to that of metallic minerals in those 
jurisdictions, except for construction materials in the Northern Territory (Hogan 
2007). An exemption of the first $50,000 is also available in the Northern Territory. 
A summary table for the resource rent royalties in Australian non-metallic resources is 
provided in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Resource rent arrangements for Australian non-metallic resources 
Jurisdiction  Arrangement  Rate 
NSW   AD VALOREM  4.00% 
  SPECIFIC  $0.35-$0.70/t 
WA  AD VALOREM  5-7.50% 
  SPECIFIC  $0.30-$0.50/t 
  PROFIT/AD VALOREM *  22.50%/7.5% 
QLD  SPECIFIC  $0.25-$1.00/t 
VIC  AD VALOREM  2.75% 
NT  PROFIT    18% 
SA  AD VALOREM  2.50% 
TAS  SPECIFIC  $1.20/t 
(Source: Hogan 2007).  
* - Ellendale Diamond Project hybrid profit/ad valorem arrangement 
 
JURISDICTIONAL FISHERIES RESOURCE COMPARISONS 
Resource rent taxes are not as prevalent with respect to Australian fishery resources as 
they are with mineral resources. Currently only NSW, Victoria and Tasmania have 
resource rent collection frameworks in place, and these rely on administratively based 
tax collection rather than automatic collection through auction-like methods. Other 
states and territories use various schemes to recover management costs, though this 
policy is considerably different from resource rent taxation. In fisheries there is an 
array of licence fees (eg annual pot licences in the rock lobster industry).  However, 
these are not designed as resource rent collection mechanisms but rather to help 
defray regulatory costs (R. Kingwell 2007, pers. comm., 8 January). Other state and 
territory governments are currently reviewing framework alternatives to potentially 
implement in the near future.  
 
Similar resource rent frameworks (ad valorem, specific) that exist in mineral 
resources can be applied to fishing resources (these have been discussed in detail in 
the previous section). A look at the specific structure of the systems in NSW, Victoria 
and Tasmania is provided in the following section.   19 
 
NSW 
The NSW Government manages fishery resources on behalf of the community 
through various regulatory mechanisms to encourage a sustainable and viable fishing 




The NSW abalone industry was declared a category one share management fishery in 
1995 under the Fisheries Management Act 1994. The community contribution 
(resource rent) charge was introduced in the Abalone Share Management Fishery in 
2000. Originally, the charge was set at 6% of the annual gross value of the fishery and 
was calculated using average beach price from the previous fishing period. This 
charge was phased in over a four year period (0% in 2000, 2% in 2001…6% in 2003).  
 
In April 2004, shareholders in the NSW abalone industry expressed concern that this 
charge was too difficult to meet due to poor economic conditions resulting in low 
beach prices. The NSW Government subsequently established a Working Group in 
August 2004 to review the system. A new method of calculation for the community 
contribution scheme was subsequently introduced that is still levied as a proportion of 
gross revenue per share, but it is now based on an indexed sliding scale that relates to 
the average annual beach price (AABP) (R. Gale 2007, pers. comm., 18 January).  
 
If the AABP falls under $43/kg then no charge is payable. If the AAPB is estimated at 
between $43/kg and $52/kg, then the charge is increased by 0.5% per dollar to 5% of 
the revenue at $52. The charge then increases by 1% per dollar to a maximum of 15% 
at $52/kg or more. The guidelines stipulate that the AABP will be set annually and the 
charge reviewed every 5 years. 
 
The rate of charge (sliding scale) for the 2004/05 period is shown in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6: Community Contribution Charge rates for NSW abalone 
Beach  
$P 
< $43  $43  $44  $45  $46  $47  $48  $49  $50  $51  $52 
% 
rate 
0  0.5  1  1.5  2  2.5  3  3.5  4  4.5  5 
Beach  
$P 
$53  $54  $55  $56  $57  $58  $59  $60  $61  $62  >$62 
% 
rate 
6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  15 
(Source: Report of the Working Group 2006) 
 
Lobster 
In 1995, the NSW lobster fishery was declared as a “share management fishery” and, 
in 1996, lobster endorsement holders were issued with shares and more rigid 
measures such as catch quota, shares and tags were introduced (DEH 2006).  
 
The reported value for commercial harvest of NSW lobsters in 2003/03 was $5.43 
million, in 2002/03. Unlike other rock lobster fisheries, the NSW fishery is small 
compared with other fishery operations. However, the high prices and popular market 
(particularly local markets for premium seafood) have caused management problems 
including illegal and unreported fishing. Restrictive management measures are in 
place to resolve such problems.  
 
There are currently 146 shareholders in the NSW lobster industry with 10,051 shares. 
The current community contribution charge is $122 per shareholder for the 2005/06 
period. However, the Lobster Share Management Fishery is currently reviewing the 
community contribution charge and so the charge has been deferred until 1
st July 2008 
(R. Gale 2007, pers. comm., 18 January).  
 
Victoria 
The Abalone industry began in Victoria 1962 and grew rapidly throughout the 1960's, 
with over 300 divers by 1968. The industry was considered to have considerable   21 
instability, poor quality control and fluctuating markets reflecting inconsistent 
catches. A new management regime was introduced whereby Victorian abalone 
fishers hold tradeable renewable 12-month ‘proprietary rights’ that can be cancelled 
(with compensation) by the Government should it be deemed to be in the public 
interest (P. Rawlinson 2007, pers. comm., 25
 January). More effective management of 
the industry has improved its status and the industry now provides over 12% of world 
production of wild abalone (Victorian Abalone Divers Association 2004).  
 
Royalty payments for access to the Victorian abalone resource have been established 
for over 15 years. The abalone industry is the only Victorian fishery that pays 100% 
of the Victorian Departments costs for managing the fishery as well as an added 
royalty. The royalty rate is based on a percentage of GVP per kilogram harvested by 
industry. It is calculated by the following equation: 
 
Royalty Rate = (0.072 x GVP) – (FMS + FRDC) 
 
Where: 
- GVP is the average weighted beach price per kilogram (for the financial year 
preceding the year to which the royalty relates) multiplied by the weight of the 
abalone in kilograms; 
- FMS represents the levies paid to Fisheries Management Services (also known 
as the cost recovery levies including management, compliance and research 
levies); and, 
- FRDC represents the levies payable to Fisheries Research and Development 
Corporation. 
 
The royalty rate fluctuates from year to year, but the rate is usually charged at 
approximately 3.5% of GVP (P. Rawlinson 2007, pers. comm., 25
 January).  
 
Tasmania 
Abalone is Tasmania’s most valued wild fisheries resource with roughly 3000 tonnes 
produced per annum representing over 50% of Australia’s total catch. The Tasmanian 
wild abalone fishery is the largest in the world representing approximately 25% of the 
market.  Prior to 1962 the Tasmanian abalone industry was unregulated. Minor   22 
regulations were then introduced such as size limits and diving licences. In the 1980’s 
abalone divers began expressing concerns of over-fishing of the abalone resource. 
This prompted a significant restructuring of the industry, where Tasmanian abalone 
fishers now hold tradeable renewable 10 year property rights (Tasmanian Abalone 
Council 2003). 
 
Tasmania’s royalty system is based on a Deed of Agreement between the Government 
and individual licensees. The previous framework was based on a sliding scale 
structure and community return rates were dependent on an increasing scale of beach 
prices. 
 
Following a decision by the Premier in 2004, changes were made to the royalty 
arrangements and these changes were introduced on 1
st January 2005. Under this 
arrangement the rate is now set at a fixed rate of 8% of the average beach price. This 
is over and above the annual licence fee (approximately $60 pa) per quota per unit.    23 
OBSERVATIONS AND ISSUES  
 
Despite the theory associated with resource rent taxation having been well developed 
for 30 years, the present inconsistency of resource rent taxation arrangements in 
Australian primary industries indicates that there is potential for inefficiency in the 
collection of such taxation. This in turn may be leading to over exploitation of public 
resources in jurisdictions that do not levy a sufficient rate of taxation, under 
exploitation where the rate of taxation is too high and/or a poor use of public wealth 
that could otherwise be used to fund social services. Inter-jurisdictional taxation 
inconsistency may also distort initial mineral exploration and development decisions. 
 
The presence of inter-jurisdictional inconsistency in resource rent taxation 
arrangements appears to highlight a need for greater cross-jurisdictional and cross-
industry comparisons with respect to these arrangements so that policy makers can act 
to minimise the distortions described above. Both qualitative and quantitative analysis 
might be usefully employed to this end. Specifically, there may be merit in 
quantitative modelling of specific mineral projects with the aim of estimating the 
magnitude and type of any rents generated, as well as the proportion appropriated by 
government. 
 
The regenerative nature of renewable resources has also presented government with 
ongoing difficulties in relation to both the maintenance of rents and the appropriation 
of a portion of such rents by government on behalf of society. It is known that open 
access to such resources tends to precipitate the competing away of rents and the 
over-exploitation of the resource. However, the apparent antidote to such ‘common 
property’ problems – the assignment of permanent property rights over renewable 
resources – may make the public appropriation of a portion of the rents by 
government more difficult, as the flow of rents to the resource owner tends to be 
capitalised into the value of the property right. This phenomenon highlights the 
importance of early consideration being given to the design of property rights systems 
that not only encourage resource use efficiency but also provide for the efficient 
collection of resource rents.  
   24 
As described earlier in this paper, a number of different jurisdictions have granted 
permanent tradeable property rights over certain fisheries, predominantly abalone, to 
guard against over-exploitation. However, this has then necessitated administratively-
based RRT arrangements that can be subject to ongoing debate between government 
and industry, often leading to arbitrary policy settings. 
   25 
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